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Preface
Icalp 2005 started a third track, dedicated to emerging subjects in Theoretical Computer Science. Specifically, in 2005, the
track was dedicated to the emerging important area of Security and Cryptography Foundations. This special issue is dedicated
to this track (Track C), and the works contained in this issue represent a wide range of subjects within the area.
The first paper, entitled Simple extractors via constructions of cryptographic pseudo-random generators, by Marius Zimand,
is in the area of pseudo-randomness, and it shows that extractors can be built fromcryptographic pseudo-randomgenerators
that are based on one-way functions. Previously this was known only for generators that are based on hard functions and
the specific problem solved in the paper was left open. The second paper, Bounds on the efficiency of black-box commitment
schemes, by OmerHorovitz and Jonathan Katz, is in the area of lower bounds on cryptographic primitives, and it gives bounds
on the efficiency of a central cryptographic primitive, called statistically-binding commitment scheme when employing a
one-way permutation as a black box. The third work, Symbolic protocol analysis in the union of disjoint intruder: Combining
decision procedure, by Yannick Chevalier andMichael Rusinowitch, is in the area of symbolic protocol analysis, and it extends
the power of symbolic analysis of cryptographic protocols to deal with an increased set of realistic protocols. Specifically,
it shows how to combine decision procedures for arbitrary intruder theories with a disjoint set of operations, provided
some decidability condition holds in each of the theories separately. Finally, the fourth paper, Basing cryptographic protocols
on tamper-evident seals, by Tal Moran and Moni Naor, is in the area of physical security and it studies physical assumptions
under which cryptographic primitives can be implemented. In particular, they consider variousmodels of locked boxeswith
tamper-evident seals and what can be implemented with them.
Let me say that while it took some time to review the papers, which caused an unexpected delay in publication (for
which I apologize), I was happy to realize that the papers presented in the special issue are still very relevant to the current
developments in the area of security and cryptography.
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